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Every four years in the United States, a Presidential Election is held.  In this election, every state 
is given a certain number of Electoral Votes and a candidate wins the election they receive more 
votes than any other candidate.  Over the years, many have questioned how fair this is.  One way 
to evaluate the power each state wields during an election was discussed by Lloyd Shapley and 
Irwin Mann. This thesis will seek to evaluate the power index values of each state by recreating 
the process employed by Shapley and Mann using modern computing. By doing so, this thesis 
will demonstrate two results: in evaluating states, the larger states will be shown to have more 
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In the United States of America any citizen age 18 and older is allowed to be part of the 
electoral process by casting their vote for their preferred candidate.  Every four years, an election 
is held to determine who becomes president.  In order for a candidate to win the presidency, they 
must obtain a plurality of electoral votes from the electoral college. A state will have at least 3 
electoral votes, and receive more depending on how populous it is. The logic behind this setup is 
that the electoral college’s vote will reflect the will of the entire population.  However, this is not 
always the case, as in the 2000 election when President George W. Bush won the Presidency but 
lost the popular vote to runner up Al Gore.   
 When this occurs, serious discussions arise as to whether or not this system of voting is 
fair. Critics argue that in the process of allocating electoral votes, states that receive a larger 
amount of electoral votes have more power when it comes to the election of the President.  
Others argue that the system in place takes the power to elect the President away from the 
people.  This thesis will employ mathematics, specifically game theory, to discover objectively 
whether or not the electoral system in place results in an imbalance of power amongst states and 
amongst the voters of the states.   
Literature Review 
 Game theory is a relatively new field of study in comparison to most other branches of 
mathematics. While other fields, like calculus and algebra, have been around for centuries or 
even millennia, game theory has only existed in its current form for a few decades. This current 
form is best described by Roger B. Myerson in his book Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict 
where he defines game theory as “the study of… conflict and cooperation between intelligent 
rational decision makers” (Myerson 1991, p. 1). The first book pertaining to game theory was 
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published by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944 entitled Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior. However, true progress in game theory, where major concepts and theorems 
were explained, did not begin until the 1950s. Much of the progress of this time was due to 
Lloyd Shapley, explaining why many key terms in the field bear his name. The Shapley value, 
for instance, was the subject of his PhD thesis “A Value for n-Person Games” (Shapley, 1953). 
Shortly following that paper, Shapley, along with Martin Shubik, wrote a paper in which they 
“offer a method for the priori evaluation of the division of power… among members of a … 
committee system” (Shapley, & Shubik, 1954). This method proved to be so useful that now 
game theorists use it to evaluate the division of power in any simple game, calling it the Shapley 
Shubik power index (Hirokawa, & Vlach, 2006; Diffo Lambo, Tchantcho, & Moulen 2012). 
 The Shapley Shubik power index is what will be used in this thesis, however, there do 
exist other power indices that could be applied. These include the Banzhaf-Coleman power 
index, the Johnson power index and the Deegan–Packel power index, all of which are discussed 
in Hirokawa and Vlach’s 2006 paper Power Analysis of Voting by Count and Account.  
Theory 
Before delving into the specifics of the Shapley Shubik power index, there are some 
terms that need to be defined. First, a game G=(N,V) is defined by a player set N={1,2,…,n}, 
and a characteristic function V: 2
N
→ℝ. Here 2N is the set of subsets of N, or set of coalitions, 
and V(S) is what coalition S can make on its own no matter what the players in N-S do. A 
simple game is where V(S) is either 0 or 1. A simple game is particularly good at modeling 
elections, just let V(S)=0 if the players in S, by themselves, do not contain enough votes to win 
the elections (making S a losing coalition), otherwise V(S)=1 and S is a winning coalition. In 
particular there is a class of simple games known as weighted games, where each player, i,  is 
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given a weight, wi, and a coalition S wins if the sum of weights of players in S is larger than or 
equal to a given quota, denoted q. Weighted games are denoted [q; w1, w2,…,wn] (Hirokawa, & 
Vlach, 2006). Some elections can be modelled as weighted games where the “players” are 
political parties or states, q is the number of votes needed to win, and the weights of each 
“player” would be the number of votes they have. The presidential election will be represented as 
such. 
In order to discuss how the power is divided in this game, the Shapley Shubik power 
index must be found.  The Shapley Shubik power index is an n-vector, where the i
th 
component 
of the vector represents the power of the i
th 
player.  This power is defined as the probability the 
player is pivotal in a random n-permutation.  Consider an ordered listing of all n players, called 
an n-permutation.  A player, i, is pivotal in this n-permutation if the set of players coming 
before i form a losing coalition while that set plus i forms a winning coalition. To get the 
probability of i being pivotal all that is needed is to divide the number of n-permutations in 
which i is pivotal by the total number of n-permutations.  
One of these terms is easy to compute, relatively; the total number of n-permutations is 
n*(n-1)*(n-2)*…*2*1 or n factorial (n!). To find the number of permutations in which a player 
is pivotal, however, is more difficult. For small values of n, one can list all n-permutations and 
count which ones a given player is pivotal. But when n gets larger, this process becomes 
impractical. One way to help is based on the following insight. Suppose Π is an n-permutation in 
which a given player, i, is pivotal. Given that permutation, one can always rearrange the players 
that precede i or rearrange the players following i and not change the fact that i is pivotal. Let k 
be the size of the set of preceding players. Then the total number of different permutation with 
the same preceding and following players is:  
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𝑘! ∗ (𝑛 − 𝑘 − 1)!       
What is needed from here is to find how many permutations with different preceding and 
following players there are and sum them up. To accomplish this, Mann and Shapley defined a 
term which represented “the number of ways in which k players, other than [player] i, can have a 
[total weight]… equal to j” which will be called ckj (Mann & Shapley, 1962). The index k will 
vary from 0 to n-1, while index j will vary from 0 to the total weight minus the weight of player i 
(w-wi). Using this term, the number of ways i is pivotal becomes: 






 This works due to the fact that “a player will be essential… only if the other players in [a 
coalition] have insufficient votes to win without [i’s] help” meaning j is less than q, “but 
sufficient votes to win with it,” meaning j + wi is at least q (Mann & Shapley, 1962). From this 
point, all that is needed is a way to compute ckj because then, the SSPI value for player i, φi 
would be: 
𝜑𝑖 = ∑










 An easy way to compute the ckj’s came from a suggestion Cantor made to use the 
following generating function: 
𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) = ∏(1 + 𝑥𝑤𝑖𝑦) 
5 
 





 in the resulting polynomial is exactly ckj (Mann & Shapley, 1962). While the product itself 
might look daunting, calculating the coefficients is rather simple through the use of matrices.  
Each matrix will be n rows by w columns, with rows indexed from 0 to n-1 and columns 
indexed from 0 to w-1, and the first matrix (C
0
) will be all 0 except entry (0,0) will be 1. Matrix 
C
0
 represents the product before any terms get multiplied, specifically, the number 1. Once the 
first term gets multiplied in, there is a 1 and an x
w1
y term, meaning C
1
 would have the (0,0) and 
(1,w1) entries be 1.  Factoring the next term in makes the (2,w1+w2) entry 1, along with 
increasing the (1,w2) entry by 1. Mann and Shapley described C
i








When the final matrix has been calculated, the (k,j) entry of that matrix would be ckj. Using what 
was just discussed, along with the equation for φI, a program was created. The program would 
take in as inputs the number of the player of interest, all the players’ weights, the number of 
players, the weight required to win, and the total weight of the game; as output, the program 
would return φi. The program just discussed is a supporting function to the full program found in 
the appendix, named “Cantor.”  
Results 
 Appendix II contains the electoral vote distribution following the 1990, 2000, and 2010 
census. By inputting the data from that appendix, the completed program outputs the Shapley 






Taking the data from the above tables will result in graphs comparing a state’s electoral 
vote size and the states SSPI value, all seen in Figure 1. Figure 1 A represents the electoral 
allocation from the 2010 census while Figure 1 B shows the allocation from the 2000 census and 
Figure 1 C shows the allocation from the 1990 census.   
Figure 1 Electoral Votes vs. SSPI Values 
 
A) 2010 Census 
 
 













































C) 1990 Census 
 
  
First consider Figure 1 A. The graph appears to behave linearly, getting larger as the 
number of electoral votes gets larger. In order to truly analyze how the data behaves, running a 
regression on all the points would be best. The resulting regression is: 
𝜑(𝑥) = −.00135 + .002𝑥 
 Here x represents the number of electoralvotes. For this regression, the p-value for our slope 
(.002) was 2.6*10
-26
. To clarify, the p-value of a term comes from a hypothesis test of whether or 
not a value is statistically different from another.  In this case, the hypothesis tested is whether or 
not the slope is equal to zero. Here the p-value is miniscule, meaning the slope of this regression 
is significant. If the slope is significant, that means the data follows an increasing trend, so as 
states get more electoral votes, they also get more power in the election game. Another piece of 
information to note is the R
2
 value, which is the measure of how well the regression explains the 
variation in the data. The R
2 
for this regression is .9988, meaning that 99.88% of the deviation is 
explained. Such a high R
2























the power index values increase proportionally. All of the previous analysis can be seen when the 
regression and the data points are graphed together, as in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: 2010 SSPI Values and Linear Regression 
 
 Figures 2 B and 2 C differ little from Figure 1 A, likely due to both the total weight and 
the weight needed to win remaining the same. One way to understand this is that if you consider 
the regression from Figure 1 A, the other two graphs just give different points on that line.  
Another method of analyzing how much power a state has is to compare the power ratios 
of each state. In order to obtain these values, the power indices must first be “rescaled to be 
directly comparable to the voting weight” (Mann & Shapley, 1962). This just means that the 
power index values will be multiplied by the total number of electoral votes to give each state a 
weighted amount of votes. The resulting value is then divided by the actual amount of votes a 
state has resulting in the power ratio. If there were no bias in the system, each power ratio should 

























shows a graph of the power ratios by raw electoral votes. The first thing to note is that there are 
many more states with a power ratio smaller than one then there are states with a power ratio 
greater than one. The most likely reason for this is because the program employed was not exact, 
causing the SSPI values to be underestimated by small amounts that skewed the power ratios. 
However, since this underestimation is rather consistent answers can still be drawn from the 
figure. As one can easily see while these values are close to 1, there is a definite increase in the 
power ratios as states get more votes, implying a bias towards larger states.  
Figure 3: Power Ratios by Electoral Votes 
 A better step in analyzing the data is to determine how much power each individual voter 
has in the election given their states electoral size.  However, to accomplish this exactly would 
require the creation of a multi-million person game. In addition, Maine and Nebraska follow a 
different method of allocating votes, giving one electoral vote to each candidate who wins a 





















contain so many players that computing the total number of n-permutations would be 
impractical. 
Therefore, what this thesis will do in order to analyze individual power, will be to take 
the Shapley Shubik power index of each state will be taken and divided by the number of people 
who voted in the last election in that state.  Taking into account the size of the voting population, 
the units will be “power per 100,000 votes”.  We obtain the data shown shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: SSPI Value per 100000 People 
 
 What is quickly evident from this scatterplot, is that for smaller vote sizes the power 
index value per of 100,000 individuals is higher than it is for states with larger vote sizes.  
Additionally though, while the values drop off quickly, around 7 electoral votes, the values 
increase slightly after that.  This seems to suggest that for individuals, you would rather be in a 
state with a small number of electoral votes, or a large number of electoral votes, but you would 


































 Another way to analyze voting power for an individual is through a power ratio, similar 
to what was employed earlier. The main difference here is that the expected number of votes 
must be compared to some measure of population size. In this case, population size will be 
measured by the number of representatives a state has in the U.S. House of Representatives. The 
number of representatives in a state can be found by subtracting two from the number of 
electoral votes it has. After finding this number all that is left is to divide the expected number of 
votes by it, resulting in the following formula: 
𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 − 2
 
 The voter power ratios are displayed below in Figure 5. Quite like the voter power 
displayed in Figure 4, the voter power ratio behaves in a similar fashion to a rational function, 
getting smaller as the number of votes a state has increases. This backs up the results from Figure 
4 that the current system favors individuals from states with fewer votes. 
























Population Power Ratio  
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 The most probable reason for this result is the same reason why states have more votes, 
there are more people there.  Since the population of these states is large, dividing the states’ 
power index values by their population will make the resulting term smaller than less populous 
states. In addition to this, every state is guaranteed at least 3 electoral votes meaning that a state 
like Alaska, with less than 3 percent of California’s voting population would still have 5 percent 
of the number of electoral votes of California.  This results in a greater relative strength for 
smaller state because the population size and voting strength do not change proportionally.   
Conclusion 
 Now what does this all mean to the question of whether or not there is an imbalance of 
power given this voting system? When discussing states, the data suggests that states with more 
votes have more power. This is in regard to both the power index for each state and the power 
ratio, the latter implying that each vote a larger state has carries more weight than a vote from a 
smaller state.  On the other hand, when discussing people, the data suggests that people who 
reside in states with a small amount of electoral votes, around 3 or 4, have more power in the 
election than people who reside in more populous states. So in conclusion, the state votes are 
biased towards larger states and individual votes are biased toward smaller states. 
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using namespace std; 
 
double factorial (double number); 




    int numPlayers, totalWeight, winWeight; 
    int i,j; 
    char fileName[20]; 
    ifstream fin; 
     
    cout << "Enter number of players: "; 
    cin >> numPlayers; 
     
    cout << "Enter total weight: "; 
    cin >> totalWeight; 
     
    cout << "Enter weight needed to win: "; 
    cin >> winWeight;  
 
    char playerName[numPlayers][20]; 
    int playerWeight[numPlayers]; 
    double powerIndex[numPlayers]; 
                
    cout << "Enter file name: "; 
    cin >> fileName; 
     
    fin.open(fileName); 
     
     
    for (i=0; i<numPlayers; i++) 
        { 
        fin >> playerName[i] >> playerWeight[i]; 
        }               
     
    fin.close(); 
 
    for (i=0; i<numPlayers; i++) 
       { 
       powerIndex[i]=Cantor(i, playerWeight, numPlayers, winWeight, totalWeight); 
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       } 
 
    cout << "The Shapley Shubik power index is:" <<endl; 
     
    for (i=0; i<numPlayers; i++) 
       { 
       cout << playerName[i] << "   " << powerIndex[i] << endl; 
       } 
 
    system("pause");     
    return 0; 
 } 
 
double factorial (double number) 
{ 
    double ans; 
    if(number<0) 
       { 
       ans=0; 
       } 
        
    else if (number==1 || number==0) 
       { 
       ans=1; 
       } 
    else 
        { 
        ans=number*factorial(number-1); 
        } 
    return ans; 
} 
 
double Cantor (int player, int weight[], int playerSet, int win, int total) 
{ 
    int i, j, k; 
    double Iterm, ans; 
    double Csum=0; 
    double sum=0; 
     
    double compMatrix[playerSet][total]; 
     
    for (i=0; i<playerSet; i++) 
        { 
        for (j=0; j<total; j++) 
            { 
            compMatrix[i][j]=0; 
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            if (i==0 && j==0) 
                { 
                compMatrix[i][j]=1; 
                } 
            } 
        }      
 
    for (i=0; i<playerSet; i++) 
        { 
        if (i!=player) 
           { 
             for (j=(playerSet-1); j>0; j--) 
              { 
                for (k=(total-1); k>0; k--) 
                 { 
                if((k-weight[i])<0) 
                    { 
                    compMatrix[j][k]=compMatrix[j][k]; 
 
                    } 
                 else 
                    { 
                    compMatrix[j][k]=compMatrix[j][k]+compMatrix[j-1][k-weight[i]]; 
                    } 
                 } 
              } 
           } 
        } 
      
     for (i=0; i<playerSet; i++) 
         { 
          for(j=(win-weight[player]); j<win; j++) 
             { 
             if (!(j<0)) 
                { 
                Csum=Csum+compMatrix[i][j]; 
                } 
             } 
          Iterm=factorial(i)*factorial(playerSet-1-i)*Csum; 
          sum = sum+Iterm; 
          Csum=0; 
         }    
     ans=(sum/factorial(playerSet)); 
     return ans; 





Table 1: Electoral Vote Allocations 
State 1990 Electoral Votes 2000 Electoral Votes 2010 Electoral Votes 
Alabama 9 9 9 
Alaska 3 3 3 
Arizona 8 10 11 
Arkansas 6 6 6 
California 54 55 55 
Colorado 8 9 9 
Connecticut 8 7 7 
Delaware 3 3 3 
District of Columbia 3 3 3 
Florida 25 27 29 
Georgia 13 15 16 
Hawaii 4 4 4 
Idaho 4 4 4 
Illinois 22 21 20 
Indiana 12 11 11 
Iowa 7 7 6 
Kansas 6 6 6 
Kentucky 8 8 8 
Louisiana 9 9 8 
Maine 4 4 4 
Maryland 10 10 10 
Massachusetts 12 12 11 
Michigan 18 17 16 
Minnesota 10 10 10 
Mississippi 7 6 6 
Missouri 11 11 10 
Montana 3 3 3 
Nebraska 5 5 5 
Nevada 4 5 6 
New Hampshire 4 4 4 
New Jersey 15 15 14 
New Mexico 5 5 5 
New York 33 31 29 
North Carolina 14 15 15 
North Dakota 3 3 3 
Ohio 21 20 18 
Oklahoma 8 7 7 
Oregon 7 7 7 
Pennsylvania 23 21 20 
Rhode Island 4 4 4 
South Carolina 8 8 9 
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South Dakota 3 3 3 
Tennessee 11 11 11 
Texas 32 34 38 
Utah 5 5 6 
Vermont 3 3 3 
Virginia 13 13 13 
Washington 11 11 12 
West Virginia 5 5 5 
Wisconsin 11 10 10 
Wyoming 3 3 3 





Table 2: Shapley Shubik power index Values per State 
State 1990 SSPI 2000 SSPI 2010 SSPI 
Alabama 0.0163909 0.0163853 0.0163783 
Alaska 0.00540555 0.00540375 0.00540152 
Arizona 0.0145434 0.0182389 0.0200908 
Arkansas 0.0108686 0.0108649 0.0108604 
California 0.108125 0.110358 0.110267 
Colorado 0.0145434 0.0163853 0.0163783 
Connecticut 0.0145434 0.0126983 0.012693 
Delaware 0.00540555 0.00540375 0.00540152 
District of Columbia 0.00540555 0.00540375 0.00540152 
Florida 0.0469309 0.0508694 0.0548339 
Georgia 0.0238495 0.0276115 0.0294947 
Hawaii 0.00722008 0.00721766 0.00721468 
Idaho 0.00722008 0.00721766 0.00721468 
Illinois 0.0410561 0.0390997 0.0371496 
Indiana 0.0219744 0.0200994 0.0200908 
Iowa 0.0127027 0.0126983 0.0108604 
Kansas 0.0108686 0.0108649 0.0108604 
Kentucky 0.0145434 0.0145384 0.0145323 
Louisiana 0.0163909 0.0163853 0.0145323 
Maine 0.00722008 0.00721766 0.00721468 
Maryland 0.0182451 0.0182389 0.0182312 
Massachusetts 0.0219744 0.0219668 0.0200908 
Michigan 0.0333336 0.0314109 0.0294947 
Minnesota 0.0182451 0.0182389 0.0182312 
Mississippi 0.0127027 0.0108649 0.0108604 
Missouri 0.0201063 0.0200994 0.0182312 
Montana 0.00540555 0.00540375 0.00540152 
Nebraska 0.00904106 0.00903802 0.00903427 
Nevada 0.00722008 0.00903802 0.0108604 
New Hampshire 0.00722008 0.00721766 0.00721468 
New Jersey 0.0276212 0.0276115 0.0257117 
New Mexico 0.00904106 0.00903802 0.00903427 
New York 0.0629683 0.0508836 0.0548339 
North Carolina 0.0257318 0.0276115 0.0275996 
North Dakota 0.00540555 0.00540375 0.00540152 
Ohio 0.0391139 0.037166 0.0333071 
Oklahoma 0.0145434 0.0126983 0.012693 
Oregon 0.0127027 0.0126983 0.012693 
Pennsylvania 0.0430093 0.0390997 0.0371496 
Rhode Island 0.00722008 0.00721766 0.00721468 
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South Carolina 0.0145434 0.0145384 0.0163783 
South Dakota 0.00540555 0.00540375 0.00540152 
Tennessee 0.0201063 0.0200994 0.0200908 
Texas 0.0609327 0.0649877 0.0732228 
Utah 0.00904106 0.00903802 0.0108604 
Vermont 0.00540555 0.00540375 0.00540152 
Virginia 0.0238495 0.0238412 0.023831 
Washington 0.0201063 0.0200994 0.0219574 
West Virginia 0.00904106 0.00903802 0.00903427 
Wisconsin 0.0201063 0.0182389 0.0182312 
Wyoming 0.00540555 0.00540375 0.00540152 
 
